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The Constructive
Receipt of Dividends
Part III*
By WILLIAm CHARLES BRAFFOED Q
BARGAwn USE OF CORORATE 1ROPERTY
It appears to be well settled that where a stockholder occu-
pies or uses corporate property for an inadequate consideration,
he will be considered to have received additional income from the
corporation. Thus, in Percy M. Chandler,' the taxpayer who
was the sole stockholder occupied rent free a residence owned
by his corporation. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Com-
missioner's inclusion of the fair rental value of this residence in
the taxpayer's income as additional compensation. The court
of appeals affirmed,' stating:
3
In the present case ... [taxpayer] was under a legal obli-
gation to provide and maintain a home for his family suit-
able to their station in life. The payment by the corpora-
tion of the expenses of maintaining the home selected by
Chandler as his family residence did in legal effect dis-
charge this obligation.... That the substantial discharge of
a legal obligation of the taxpayer represents for tax pur-
poses a distribution to him is well settled.
The taxpayer contended that the corporation made a gift of the
* This is the third and final part of a thesis submitted in partial fiulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Law of the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois. Part one treats the tax consequences of stockholder advances
and loans to the corporation and advances and loans by the corporation to some
or all of the stockholders. It appears in 46 Ky. L.J. 515 (1958). Part two treats
the tax consequences of compensation paid to the stockholder-officers of the
corporation, rentals and royalties paid to stockholders, and distribution of prop-
erty and bargain sales and purchases. It appears in 47 Ky. L.J. 17 (1958).
** LL.B., University. of Kentucky; LL.M., University of Ilinois. Attorney
National Labor Relations Board, Cincinnati, Ohio.
141 B.T.A. 165 (1940).
2 119 F. 2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941).
3 Id. at 628.
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use of the residence to him. The court disposed of this conten-
tion by stating:4
The corporate 'person' may be deemed by a fiction of the
law to have abilities normally ascribed to man but the
fiction cannot be indulged to the extent of endowing the
corporation with feelings of love and affection for its stock-
holders, officers and directors. It is only because of the
love and affection which a normal human donor feels for
members of his family that it is presumed by the law that
a transfer of property by him to them is a gift. The basis for
such a presumption is entirely absent when the donor is
a corporation.
The same result was reached in Dean v. Commissioner;5 where
the court refused to disregard the corporate entity. There the
taxpayer and his wife transferred title to a residence, which they
owned and occupied, to their corporation at the insistence of a
bank to whom the corporation was indebted. The court held
that the fair rental value of the residence was income to the
husband stating that there was nothing to show that the cor-
porate existence was anything but bona fide.
Even where the stockholder pays a rental for the use of
corporate property, he may still be considered to have received
income. In Henry B. Peacock, Jr.,6 the sole stockholder occu-
pied a residence owned by the corporation paying a rental of
$900 a year. The fair rental value was $2,100 per year. He was
held to have received income to the extent of the difference be-
tween the rent paid and the fair rental value of the property.
The court stated:7
We are of the opinion that petitioner and his mother, the
sole owners of ... the corporation, occupied its property
at a bargain rental, and that the lease was not a bona fide
arms-length transaction ... whether the petitioner's share
of the difference between $2,100 and $900 be deemed
compensation for services, nominal or otherwise, or merely
gain, it was taxable income.
In practically all the cases in which the issue has been pre-
sented, it has been held that the value represented by the use
4 Id. at 627.
5187 F. 2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951).
6 P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. § 56245.
7 Id. at 1019.
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of the property was compensation for services rendered by the
stockholder and not a dividend." The significance of so holding
is that the full amount will be subject to tax even though the cor-
poration has little or no earnings. In Charles A. Fruehauf,' the
taxpayer argued that the difference was not compensation. There
the rental value of the property was over $10,000. Since earn-
ings and profits of the corporation available for dividends during
the year amounted to only $2,800, the taxpayer sought to invoke
Section 115(a) of the 1939 Code which would have limited his
realization of taxable income to $2,800. The Board of Tax Ap-
peals held, however, that the full amount was compensation
and as such was taxable in full regardless of corporate profits.
The tax burden .in this area is further compounded by the fact
that the corporation is not entitled to any additional deduction
for compensation.10
The recent case of Louis Greenspun," however, suggests
dividend treatment so that the status of the earnings and profits
of the corporation would serve to limit the realization of income
by stockholders. Whether this decision will set a trend cannot
be determined at this time. In this case the taxpayer owned a
farm where he maintained his residence. A corporation of which
he was president and principal stockholders spent large sums
fixing up the farm as a horticultural showplace where customers
of the company were entertained. Later the taxpayer sold the
farm to the corporation but continued to live there, paying a
monthly rental of $500. The Tax Court held that the amounts
which the corporation spent for operating and maintaining the
farm prior to the sale were not deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses by the corporation and constituted addi-
tional income to the taxpayer. The question as to whether the tax-
payer realized additional income through the use of the farm and
machinery which the corporation owned after the sale was not
raised by the Commissioner and the Tax Court did not determine
this question. On appeal, the court of appeals affimed, 2 holding
that the expenditures made by the corporation in beautifying
8 Charles A. Frauehauf, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934); E. M. Dobson, P-H 1946
T.C. Mer. Dec. § 46182.
9 Supra note 8.
'0 Reynard Corporation, 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938).
"23 T.C. 138 (1954).
12 229 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
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the farm constituted corporate distributions in the nature of
dividends which were non-deductible. Thus, if the Greenspun
decision were followed, it would appear to be open to the stock-
holder to argue in any subsequent case that such a distribution
would not be taxable to him unless the corporation had sufficient
earnings and profits to support a taxable dividend. It would be
better to avoid receipt of such a dividend, however, and the
wiser path would be for the stockholders to retain title to their
residential properties.
The only method by which a stockholder-employee may
avoid the receipt of additional compensation or a dividend by
the use of corporate property is through application of the "con-
venience of the employer rule." By incorporating regulations
which have been in effect for some time, Section 119 of the
1954 Code provides that there shall be excluded from gross in-
come the value of any lodgings furnished an employee for the
convenience of the employer if "the employee is required to
accept such lodgings on the business premises of his employer
as a condition of his employment." It would be an extraordinary
case where a stockholder could take advantage of this section.
However McCarty v. Cripe,13 contained facts which brought the
case within the "convenience" rule. There the court held that
the stockholder-employee did not realize income from the rent-
free occupancy of a hotel apartment which was furnished for
the convenience and necessity of the corporation. The stock-
holder-employee managed the hotel and his services were avail-
able and required on a 24-hour basis. However, even where a
case can be brought within the "convenience of the employer
rule," it may be held that part of the rental value is not at-
tributable to the "convenience of the employer" and is to be
included in gross income. 4
Chapter II
PAYmENTS ON BEHALF OF THE STOCKHOLDER BY Tnm CoRPoRAToN
Where direct payments are made by the corporation on be-
half of a stockholder in discharge of the latter's obligations, it
1344 AFTR 978 (D.C. Ind. 1952), aff'd, 201 F. 2d 679 (7th Cir. 1953),
without discussion of this point.
14 Olin 0. Ellis, 6 T.C. 138 (1946).
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is settled law that such a payment will constitute a dividend to
the stockholder if corporate profits and earnings are sufficient
to support a taxable dividend." Where payments are made in
a more indirect manner, a question arises whether such pay-
ments are on behalf of the corporation or are for the personal
benefit of the stockholder. Section 162(a) of the Code allows
as a deduction all the "ordinary and necessary expenses" paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. Business expenses and deductions of closely held cor-
porations are usually scrutinized by the service to determine
whether the expenses were paid for the benefit of the cor-
poration or whether they are personal, living, or family expenses
of the stockholders. In any case where the stockholder of a
close corporation has received an "economic benefit" from a
particular expenditure made by the corporation, there is a strong
possibility that he will be deemed to have received other addi-
tional compensation or a constructive dividend from the cor-
poration. Whether a particular expenditure is a personal, living
or family expense or a legitimate corporate expense usually
turns on the question of whether the expenditure is ordinary
and necessary within Section 162(a) relating to the deduction
of corporate business expenses. The line between these two
situations is not always clear.
The most questionable items are in the area of travel and
entertainment expenses. The Commissioner has ordered his
agents to bear down on travel and entertainment expenses and
more significantly, he has directed that any disallowed portion
be taxed as a dividend to the stockholders receiving the benefit
of the expenditures.' Recent decisions indicate that the courts
are going along with this action. However, in some of the cases
it is not clear whether the additional income which results from
the disallowance of a deduction is compensation or dividends.
In Alex Silverman,17 the deductibility of traveling expenses
was before the court. The corporation paid the traveling ex-
15 Emil Liecht, P-H 1941 T.C. Mer. Dec. § 41111, aff'd, 137 F. 2d 433 (8th
Cir. 1943), discharge of stockholders debt; Mark Kleenden, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem.
Dec. § 44345, discharge of personal notes of stockholder; Municipal Securities Co.,
P-H 1945 T.G. Mer. Dec. § 45046, personal legal and accounting expenses of
the stockholder.
16 IR-Circ. 57-85 (June 20, 1957).
1728 T.C. 1061 (1957), aff'd, (8th Cir. April 16, 1958).
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penses of a stockholder-officer and his wife on a European
buying trip. The Commissioner disallowed as an ordinary and
necessary business expense 50% of the cost of the trip on the
grounds that these were personal expenses and determined that
this was additional income to the stockholder. The evidence
showed that the wife's presence did not serve a bona fide busi-
ness purpose, and that she was there on a honeymoon trip. The
court upheld the Commissioner's contention that the part of the
expense attributable to the wife was additional income to the
stockholder without indicating whether it was compensation or
dividends stating:'8
It is also well settled that where funds of a corporation
are disbursed for the personal use or economic benefit
of a stockholder or his immediate family, there being no
intention of repayment, the amounts so disbursed are
either the equivalent of corporate distributions or addi-
tional compensation for services (depending on the facts
and circumstances), especially in the case of dealings be-
tween closely held corporations and their stockholders.
As to the stockholder's contention that the portion of the ex-
penses attributable to his wife was a wedding gift by the cor-
poration to her, it was stated by the court that:' 9
Under such circumstances, the corporation's payment of
funds for the personal use of Alex's wife, which also was
of economic benefit to him, must be shown to have been
a disbursement which satisfied all of the legal require-
ments of a gift. The proof should be very clear and 'cer-
tain that a bona fide gift was made by the corporation,
applying all of the tests as they would be applied in deal-
ings between a corporation and an individual dealing at
arm's length.
The court then concluded that there was no gift here, pointing
to the lack of director's authorization or stockholder's approval
of a gift of corporate funds and the fact that the corporation had
treated this sum on its books as a business expense. The court
stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether this disburse-
ment represented additional compensation or a constructive
dividend for, in either event, it represented additional income
18 Id. at 1064.
19 Id. at 1067.
1959]
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to the stockholder. It is believed that the court was not accurate
in this last statement. If the disbursement represented addi-
ional compensation, it should be deductible from corporate in-
come as an ordinary and necessary expense provided the total
compensation paid the shareholder was reasonable. On the
other hand, if the additional sum was a distribution of property
to the shareholder, it would not be taxable if earnings and profits
of the corporation were insufficient to support a taxable divi-
dend. However, neither of these questions was presented and
argued by the taxpayer. Where traveling is done both for busi-
ness and pleasure, the regulations have established a somewhat
arbitrary dividing line as to when they will be deductible. It is
provided that if the trip is primarily personal, the traveling ex-
penses are not deductible even though the taxpayer does engage
in some business while on the trip.20 As to when a trip shall be
deemed primarily personal it is provided:2
Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade
or business or is primarily social in nature depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The amount of time
during the trip which is spent on personal activities com-
pared to the amount of time spent on activities directly
relating to the taxpayer's trade or business is an important
factor in determining whether the trip is primarily per-
sonal.
Entertainment expenses have also been held to be a con-
structive dividend in several recent cases. In Greenspun v. Com-
22missioner, 2 the taxpayer was the principal stockholder of a
corporation engaged in the manufacture of pipe. Finding it
difficult to compete with other companies engaged in the same
business by the use of conventional promotional techniques, it
was decided to create a horticultural showplace at the stock-
holder's farm for the purpose of entertaining customers. The
corporation expended large sums for flowers, shrubbery, farm
tools, fertilizer and machinery. The evidence showed that some
customers were entertained at the farm, but did not show the
times or number of customers involved. The farm was also
used as the stockholder's home and for the entertainment of
2oProposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(f) (2) (1955).21 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2) (1955).
22229 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
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relatives and friends. The court held that the relationship be-
tween the "aesthetic stimulation of customers" and his "order
for pipe was much too oblique" and disallowed a deduction
of these expenses by the corporation. The court in its opinion
stated that these expenditures constituted constructive dividends
to the stockholder.
The need of keeping adequate records to substantiate travel
and entertainment deductions was vividly brought out in the
recent case of B. F. Crabbe.2 In this case the taxpayer was
president and majority stockholder of a corporation engaged
in the business of selling water works and sewerage materials
in the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Florida. In connection with
the business of the corporation it was necessary to visit and
entertain customers in these states. Because of lack of sub-
stantiation, the Commissioner allowed only 50, 43 and 41 per
cent of the traveling and entertainment expenses, respectively,
for the three fiscal years in question and determined that the
disallowed portion for two years amounting to $9,953.03 was
a constructive dividend to the stockholder. The major portions
of the amounts were withdrawn from the corporation in the form
of checks payable to cash. The evidence also showed that the
stockholder's wife accompanied him on several trips. The Tax
Court sustained the Commissioner's determination and held that
the stockholder received constructive dividends since he did
not show that the corporation had insufficient earnings and
profits for this purpose.
Many other types of purported business expenses also re-
ceive special scrutiny by the Commissioner for the purpose of
imposing a constructive dividend. In Beer v. United States,24
the corporation incurred expenses of $31,000 in settlement of a
claim against the corporation, its directors and the stockholders.
The corporation claimed a deduction for this item as an ordinary
and necessary business expense. The court found that the pur-
pose of the settlement was to prevent a threatened receivership
which would adversely affect the business of the corporation and
cause a reduction in the value of the stock in the stockholder's
23 P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. § 56052.
24 132 F. Supp. 282 (D.C. Ala. 1955).
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hands with a consequent reduction in dividend payments. Ac-
cordingly, it was held that the expenses were incurred for the
benefit of the stockholders and not the corporation, and that
the $81,000 expenditure was correctly treated by the Commis-
sioner as a constructive dividend to each stockholder to the
extent of his pro rata portion.
In American Properties, Inc., " a corporation engaged in the
rental of real estate deducted as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense the cost of designing, constructing and racing
speedboats. Speedboats were the personal hobby of the sole
stockholder and none of the boats had ever been sold though
many people had offered to buy them. There was some indica-
tion that the corporation, might undertake the manufacture of
these boats on a commercial scale in the future, but nothing
had been done along these lines and plans were indefinite as
to when such manufacturing might start. The court found that
there was no intention of immediately embarking upon a busi-
ness venture and that the expenses were made for the personal
pleasure of the stockholder. The court then held that the ex-
penses incurred by the corporation constituted constructive
dividends to the stockholder since there were sufficient earnings
and profits for this purpose. That there must be sufficient earn-
ings and profits in these cases to support a taxable dividend was
also brought out in the Crabbe decision. In that case, the cor-
poration paid a law firm $2,000 for def6nding the stockholder
against a conspiracy indictment. The court agreed with the
Commissioner that this expenditure was personal in nature and
indicated that it would ordinarily be treated as a dividend, but
since the Commissioner failed to prove the amount of earnings
and profits it was held that this sum was not taxable to the
stockholder.
Chapter III
PURCHASE OF INSURANCE BY TE CORPORATION UPON THE LivES
OF n STOCKHOLDERS
Since management and ownership of a close corporation
are practically synonymous, the death of one of the stockholders
25 28 T.C. 1100 (1957).
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can have far reaching consequences. Although the corporate
entity continues, the stock of the deceased stockholder may fall
into the hands of outsiders who may disrupt the harmonious
management of the corporation. Consequently, it is desirable
that the stockholders devise a plan for acquisition of the stock
of a deceased stockholder. To accomplish this objective and to
provide liquid funds for this purpose, stock-purchase agree-
ments funded with insurance have become the accepted pattern
in recent years. Where the corporation pays premiums on in-
surance upon the life of a stockholder whose estate or family is
the beneficiary, it is clear that the stockholder has received a
dividend distribution from the corporation.26 On the other hand,
where the corporation is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under
the policy, premiums paid by the corporation are not dividends
to a stockholder. The determination of the question as to whether
the stockholder has received constructive dividends turns on the
question as to who stands to benefit from the policy and who is in
substance the beneficiary under the policy. The rules are easy to
state, but hard to apply as has been demonstrated by several re-
cent cases.
That the purchase of insurance for the purpose of buying
the stock of a deceased stockholder is a valid corporate purpose
was expressly brought out in the case of Emeloid Co. v. Com-
missioner.27 However, whether a bona fide corporate purpose is
sufficient to avoid a constructive dividend to the stockholders is
uncertain at this time. In the Emeloid case, the taxpayer-corpor-
ation purchased single premium life insurance policies on the lives
of its two principal stockholders. It borrowed $97,500 with which
to pay the premiums. Subsequently, a trust agreement was en-
tered into whereby the stockholders and their wives agreed to
sell to the corporation the shares of the first stockholder who
should die. The proceeds of the insurance policies were used
for this purpose. The corporation was named beneficiary under
the policies. The basic question in the case was whether the
$97,500 qualified as borrowed invested capital within the mean-
ing of the excess profits tax, and this depended on whether the
indebtedness was incurred for a business purpose. The Tax
26 Casper Ranger Construction Co., 1 B.T.A. 942 (1925); Paramount-Rich-
ards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
27 189 F. 2d 280 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing 14 T.C. 1295 (1950).
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Court held, in effect, that the insurance was purchased to further
the interests of the stockholders and did not serve any business
purpose of the corporation. The court of appeals reversed. It
held that there was a definite business purpose by the purchase
of this insurance and stated: 28
What corporate purpose could be considered more essen-
tial than key man insurance? The business that insures
its buildings and machinery and automobiles from every
possible hazard can hardly be expected to exercise less
care in protecting itself against the loss of two of its most
vital assets-managerial skill and experience. In fact the
government has not seriously contended here that key
man insurance is not a proper corporate purpose.
Referring to the fact that the corporation was the beneficiary of
the policies and that the insurance had been in effect for approxi-
mately four years before the trust agreement was executed the
court stated:29
The trust was designed to implement that original pur-
pose, and, at the same time, added a further business
objective, viz., to provide for continuity of harmonious
management. Harmony is the essential catalyst for achiev-
ing good management; and good management is the
sine qua non of long-term business success.... Petitioner
apparently anticipated that, should one of its key stock-
holders die, those beneficially interested in his estate might
enter into active participation in corporate affairs and
possibly introduce an element of friction. Or his estate,
not being bound by contract to sell the stock to petitioner,
might sell it to adverse interests.
In answer to the Tax Court's holding that the insurance was for
the benefit of the stockholders, the court of appeals stated that
the benefits to them were incidental and indirect and that it
would be difficult to think of any case where the stockholders
do not indirectly benefit when the corporation receives funds.
Although the question was not involved, the implication of
the Emeloid decision was that where the corporation is the
designated beneficiary of the policy of insurance on the life of
one of its stockholders, the proceeds of which are to be used
to purchase his stock upon death, the premiums paid thereon do
2sId. at 288.
29 Ibid.
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not constitute constructive dividends to the stockholders. An
additional important factor in this case was the fact that the
insurance represented an asset on the books of the corporation
and could have been reached by creditors of the corporation.
In spite of the language of the Emeloid case, however, an
analysis of recent decisions indicates that the Tax Court regards
as of little significance the corporate purpose underlying the
purchase of such insurance, and looks instead to the question
of whether the stockholder has received an "economic benefit"
from such insurance. If an "economic benefit" can be found,
the Tax Court has consistently held that the premium payments
by the corporation constitute constructive dividends to the stock-
holders. Although the courts of appeals have reversed the Tax
Court in several of these cases, the current rush of litigation
indicates the uncertainty prevailing in this area. In Lewis v.
O'Mally,30 the taxpayer who was president and principal stock-
holder arranged for the corporation to purchase a single premium
life insurance policy on his life for $50,000. The corporation
was the owner of the policy. However, the stockholder had the
right to designate the beneficiary. The corporation from time
to time withdrew loans on the policy and subsequently the policy
was surrendered and the proceeds were repaid to the corpor-
ation. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the
stockholder on the ground that the $50,000 paid for the insur-
ance constituted a dividend. The district court sustained the
Commissioner on the ground that inasmuch as the stockholder
had the right to designate the beneficiary, the preminums were
dividends to him. The court of appeals reversed, stating that
the controlling fact was that the stockholder did not receive
a single dollar from this purchase and that he was not benefited.
The court stated that it need not decide the question of the tax
effect of the right of the stockholder to nominate beneficiaries
or the tax consequences if the st6ckholder had died. Although
there was no stock purchase agreement in this case, it indicates
that the Commissioner is looking into all purchases of insurance
by a close corporation in an endeavor to find some "economic
benefit" to the stockholder. In Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc.
v. Commissioner,31 such a benefit was found. In this case the
30 140 F. 2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
31 Supra note 26.
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corporation took out an insurance policy on the life of its stock-
holder for the purpose of funding a stock-purchase agreement.
The stockholder was entitled to designate the beneficiary. The
court found that both the corporation and the stockholder were
benefited and held that the stockholder was taxable on the por-
tion of the premium payments allocable to his stock interest in
the corporation as a constructive dividend. Sanders v. Fox, 32 is
another case in which an "economic benefit" was found by the
district court. Here the corporation and its four stockholders
entered into an agreement which provided that the corporation
was to purchase the stock of any deceased stockholder. The
agreement required the corporation to purchase insurance on
the lives of each of the stockholders to fund the stock-purchase
plan. The corporation was to pay the premiums and be desig-
nated the owner of the policies. The insured stockholders, how-
ever, were given the right to designate the beneficiaries. The
Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the stockholders on
the ground that the insurance premiums were constructive divi-
dends to them. The district court stated that the pivotal point for
decision was whether the stockholders, or the corporation, or
both, derived economic benefits from the insurance. In sus-
taining the Commissioner, the court conceded that the corpor-
ation would benefit from the fact that the plan assured it of
keeping its stock intact, but pointed out that the stockholders
were benefited since the death of each stockholder would result
in a larger portion of the capital and surplus being owned by the
surviving stockholders. The court also pointed out that under
the plan a definite fund was created which would guarantee
to the stockholder's beneficiary receipt of the fair market value
of the stock upon his death. On appeal, the court of appeals re-
versed,3 3 holding that the stockholders received no present "eco-
nomic benefit" and that the value of their estates had not been
increased. The court stated that even though the stockholders
could designate beneficiaries, the proceeds of the policies were
made subject to the agreement and the corporation retained
ownership of the policies. The court stated:34
32 149 F. Supp. M4 (1957).
33 -1958 Fed. Tax Serv. para 58611 (10th Cir. Mar. 20, 1958).
34 Id. at 581887.
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The immediate present benefits to the stockholder... such
as the assurance of a market at a guaranteed minimum
return on his stock, the appreciation of the value of his
stock, and the retention of corporate officers acceptable' to
his limited group, are not taxable incidents. . . . The
immediate benefits of the investment redound to the cor-
poration. Under such circumstances it is not proper to
impress premium presently being paid with the label of
constructive dividends. Upon the death or withdrawal of
a stockholder, tax complications including the possibility
of an assessment of constructive dividends may arise....
(Emphasis added.)
That the Tax Court continues to lay little stress on corporate
purpose was recently demonstrated in Henry E. Prunier.3 5 Two
brothers *owned substantially all the stock of a corporation. The
corporation paid the premiums on policies of insurance totaling
$45,000 on their lives. Each of the stockholders was named
beneficiary of the policies on the other's life, although it was in-
tended that the corporation was to use the proceeds to purchase
the stock interest of the stockholder who should first die. The
Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the taxpayers on the
ground that the premiums paid on the insurance during 1950
represented dividends from the corporation. It was only in 1952,
after the Commissioner had given notice of the deficiencies that
the corporation was designated beneficiary of the policies. In
sustaining the Commissioner, the Tax Court pointed out that
the corporation would not have been enriched by receiving the
proceeds because they were insufficient to pay the full value of
the stock; that the corporation's indebtedness to creditors would
have remained undiminshed; and that while the corporation
would have eliminated the decedent's stock interest, the pro-
portional interest of the surviving stockholder would have been
greatly increased. The court then stated:86
[S]ince the record does not otherwise indicate any benefits
which might flow to the corporation from the purchase of
a deceased insured's stock interest, we conclude that dur-
ing the taxable year the corporation was neither the bene-
ficial owner nor beneficiary of the insurance policies. ...
3528 T.C. 19 (1957).
36 Id. at 26.
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It then held that the stockholders' interests in the policies were
of such magnitude and of such value as to constitute them direct
or indirect beneficiaries of the policies. Three judges dissented,
pointing out that the corporation could go into a court of equity
and obtain the proceeds of the policies. They also stated that
a corporation's purchase of its own stock can be viewed as a
corporate purpose, and that it would be difficult to think of any
case where the stockholders do not indirectly benefit when the
corporation receives funds. Agreeing with these dissenting Tax
Court judges, the court of appeals reversed,37 and pointed out
that the corporation was beneficial owner of the insurance under
Massachusetts law. In answer to the argument that the stock-
holders were benefited by the insurance the court stated:38
In a loose manner of speaking, it can be said that any
corporate gain is a benefit, indirectly to the stockholders,
so that if a corporation becomes beneficial owner of insur-
ance policies the stockholders receive the benefit thereof.
Of course this argument proves too much, for it would
lead to the conclusion that profits made by the corpora-
tion are automatically taxable income to the stockholder.
This is contrary to the taxation scheme of the Internal
Revenue Code.
The court held that the Tax Court could not ignore the fact that
the corporation was a separate legal entity and a separate tax
unit. It also pointed out that although the corporation may have
been contractually bound to apply the proceeds of the policy to
buy the interest of a deceased stockholder, this did not mean
that the corporation would not have been "enriched" by collect-
ing the face amount of the policy. As to corporate purpose, the
court said that "if it were necessary to look for a corporate busi-
ness purpose, in the present case, we could refer to the argu-
ments in Mannheimer and Friedman, 'Stock-Retirement Agree-
ments' ". In this article the authors stated:39
Even while the decedent is still alive, the agreement and
insurance benefit the corporation because they tend to
stabilize the corporation's business. If the bank knows
about the agreement, it may well be inclined to extend
37 248 F. 2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
38 Id. at 821.
39 Mannheimer & Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements, 28 Taxes 423,425
(1950).
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credit more liberally to the corporation because the possi-
bility of inexperienced stockholders injecting themselves
into the management is eliminated. If the key employees
are informed of the agreement, it will be an inducement
to them to remain with the corporation because they
realize that the continuation of the business in the hands
of the survivor is assured-and with it their jobs.
The recent case of Oresta Casale,40 is another case where
the Tax Court readily found a constructive dividend only to be
reversed. Here the corporation purchased a combined life and
annuity policy on the life of its president and principal stock-
holder to fund a deferred compensation agreement. The cor-
poration was declared the owner and beneficiary of the policy.
The Commissioner determined a deficiency based on the ground
that the premium of $6,839.50 paid by the corporation was a
constructive dividend to the stockholder. He argued that the
transaction was lacking in bona fides and was no more than a
device whereby the taxpayer purchased a retirement annuity
for himself with corporate funds. The Tax Court agreed with the
Commissioner's contention stating:
41
[W]e must conclude that the corporation was no more
than a mere conduit running from the insurer to petitioner,
or his beneficiaries, with respect to the payments which
might have come due under the insurance contract.
The second circuit court of appeals reversed,42 stating several
reasons for its conclusion. First, the court stated that the Tax
Court's finding that the corporate entity was a "sham" was based
solely on the fact that the controlling stockholder could direct
the activities of the corporation and concluded: 43
[Me have been cited no case or legislative provision
which supports the proposition that the entity of a cor-
poration which is actively engaged in a commercial enter-
prise may be disregarded for tax purposes merely because
it is wholly owned or controlled by a single person.
Secondly, the court pointed out that the corporation possessed
the right to assign the policy, the right to' change its beneficiary,
40 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
41 Id. at 1025.
42 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
43 Id. at 445.
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the right to receive dividends, and the right to borrow on the
policy, while the stockholder, on the other hand, had nothing
more than a contract right to deferred compensation payments
which would have been terminated by insolvency of the cor-
poration. The court distinguished the Paramount-Richards
Theatres case on the grounds that there the policy belonged to
the individuals and could not have been reached by the cor-
porate creditors. It was concluded that the stockholder received
no "immediate personal benefit" and therefore, he could not be
held to have received constructive dividends fr6m the corpor-
ation.
Facts somewhat similar to the Prunier case were presented in
Doran v. Commissioner.44 There the corporation paid premiums
on insurance on the lives of the six stockholders. The proceeds
were payable to trustees as beneficiaries and owners of the pol-
icies to be used by them to purchase the stock of any of the
stockholders who died. The purchase was to be made for the
benefit of the surviving stockholders. On the death of one of the
stockholders, the proceeds were so applied. The Tax Court held
that the trustees were agents of the corporation and that the cor-
poration received the proceeds of the insurance. Thus the sur-
viving stockholders were deemed to have realized a dividend
by the purchase of the deceased stockholder's shares for their
benefit. It appears that the premiums paid by the corporation
were clearly dividends and no contention was made as to this
amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the insur-
ance in question was purchased by the trustees for and on be-
half of the individual stockholders and that the corporation was
not beneficiary of either the insurance or the trust. The lan-
guage of the court implied, however, that if the corporation had
been named beneficiary and had so used the proceeds, the sur-
viving stockholders would have realized a dividend from the
corporation for the full amount of such proceeds. This result
was also implied in the Sanders case.
Until certainty is introduced into this area, it appears that
stock-purchase agreements funded with insurance might well be
a hazardous undertaking so far as the constructive receipt of
dividends is concerned. Although the Emeloid and Prunier deci-
44 246 F. 2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
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sions held that where the corporation is named beneficiary of
the policy, no constructive dividends are received by the stock-
holders, Doran and Sanders leave doubt. On the contrary the
implications are that this factor would give rise to such a dividend.
Conclusion
The tax problems relating to the closely held corporation
which are discussed herein are only a few of the tax problems
with which such corporations must cope. They are sufficient,
however, to point up the fact that the present method of taxing
the income of closely held corporations is far from satisfactory.
These problems arise from the recognition of the corporation as
an independent and separate taxable entity, when as a prac-
tical matter, they are little more than incorporated partner-
ships or sole proprietorships. Not only does recognition of the
corporate entity make transactions between closely held cor-
porations and their stockholders uncertain tax-wise, but such
recognition gives rise to tax avoidance and tax manipulation
schemes.
The obvious solution would appear to be to disregard the
corporate entity for tax purposes and to tax the stockholders
of a closely held corporation directly upon their proportionate
shares of corporate income in the same manner in which the
income of partnerships is taxed to the partners. As has been
previously mentioned, this is certainly not an innovation. Of
course corporations have undergone tremendous growth both
in size and in number since the Civil War era. Therefore, for
such a system of taxation to be administratively feasible, a
distinction would have to be made between corporations which
can rightly be labeled closely held and those which are public
corporations due either to their size or number of stockholders.
Any distinction based upon the number of stockholders or upon
an arbitrary amount of capitalization would appear to be un-
wise. It may be possible to make a distinction between those
corporations whose stock is sold to the public through the stock
exchanges, and those whose stock is closely held and is not sold
in any recognized market. Stock ownership is relatively stable
in this area and it should not be difficult to make the distinction.
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A provision permitting corporations to be treated as partner-
ships for tax purposes was added to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 as section 1351 by the Senate. This provision was de-
leted, however, in conference. The election applied only in
the case of corporations, having only one class of stock, or-
ganized after December 31, 1953, owned by not more than
10 stockholders, all of whom are active in the business, and
all of whom consent to the election. If such provisions were
adopted it would be necessary of course to provide exceptions
to the general rule. To deal with corporations such as Ford
Motor Company prior to the release of its stock to the public,
the proposed method of taxation would have to be made op-
tional. Some corporations would not elect partnership treatment
of their income. However, there are many cases where the
corporations are organized for the purpose of providing limited
liability for the stockholders and where the stockholders would
gladly shed the tax problems which arise from the recognition
of the corporation as a separate taxable entity.*
* [Editor's Comment] After the writing of this article, Congress amended
the Internal Revenue Code to allow certain close corporations, if they so choose, to
be treated tax-wise as if they are partnerships. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§
1371-77.
